by Randolph Kent

of the Humanitarian Futures Programme,

King’s College, London

The intensity and frequency of humanitarian crises are on their way up and there is little doubt that the types and impacts of humanitarian crises and their dimensions and dynamics will continue to increase exponentially over the coming decades. Three recent mega-disasters – the earthquake in Haiti, massive flooding in Pakistan, and the recent earthquake and tsunami in Japan – collectively suggest the need for new approaches and changing mind-sets for identifying and dealing with future crises and emerging threats: the what might bes of the future.

These challenges also suggest the need for a more effective and rigorous understanding ofthe political and social transformations that will affect humanitarian action over the coming decades. In particular, those with humanitarian responsibilities need to better understand the implications of a range of emerging trends, including the reassertion of national sovereignty over humanitarian response, a narrowing and politicization of humanitarian space, and a resurgent, shifting and dynamic role for non-state actors.  

The reassertion of national sovereignty, the narrowing of humanitarian corridors and resurgence of non-state actors

As thousands of Syrians fled Jisr al-Shughour in early June 2011 for the safety of Turkey, the government in Ankara made it clear that the numbers of refugees and the cause of their flight were too sensitive to warrant extensive publicity. The Turkish government emphasised that their relations with neighbouring Syria was too important to fall prey to possibly exaggerated claims by refugees.

This incident is but one of a growing number of examples about the narrowing corridors of humanitarian intervention. In various ways the certitudes and opportunities for traditional humanitarian actors to provide assistance are becoming subject to a growing number of constraints. To a significant extent, these constraints reflect a fundamentally changing geo-political context and an emerging confidence that means that international humanitarian assistance is increasingly less ‘the preferred option’.

Various aspects of these emerging trends are not new for those who, for example, have tried to provide humanitarian assistance in so-called “complex emergencies.”  Yet, from seemingly exceptional phenomena, these trends will for the foreseeable future become the norm. They will come at a time when the types, dimensions and dynamics of a growing number of humanitarian crises will require more effective regional and international engagement, a greater appreciation of the hazards and opportunities afforded by science and technology and means to garner far more extensive and robust response capacities than exist now. And, at the same time, they will require the humanitarian sector to develop new approaches for balancing increasingly fragile humanitarian principles against a new era of realpolitik.

From Myanmar’s Cyclone Nargis to China’s Sichuan catastrophe, from Sri Lanka’s defeat of the Tamil Tigers and the 2010 food crisis in Zimbabwe to Chile’s 2010 earthquake, the number of incidents reflecting the assertion of national authority over international humanitarian response is growing. The characteristics of this new era of political realism begin in no small part with a changing set of assumptions about the political nature of humanitarian crises. Such crises have moved from the periphery of political interests to a core calculation in terms of political survival. With that in mind, international intervention becomes a questionable option for more and more states. To relegate one’s perceived political responsibilities to external actors is a less attractive alternative than mobilising domestic resources and capacities.

This national option is further influenced by the fact that what will be called suzerain-tributary relationships are also emerging in many parts of the world as protective shields against perceived Western hegemonic values and intrusion. In other words, potential powers such as India and China who have increasingly strong ties with a number of states in Africa, Central and South East Asia offer a more state-supportive approach to assistance than often has been the case from the West. Tribune states earn the protection of suzerains through the former’s natural resources, potential markets and even political alignments. From the spectre of the international humanitarian sector, emerging suzerain-tributary relationships will further narrow the corridors of external intervention, no matter how well intentioned the cause.

These changing dynamics are, in effect, leading to a growing politicization of humanitarian response. This, in turn, is driving a resurgence of forces that will increasingly challenge the emergence of more robust state authority. One such element is a range of non-state actors – from armed belligerent groups that represent a challenge to state stability, through to less formal, often amorphous groups, sometimes empowered by new social media technologies, and characterised by rapidly shifting allegiances, strategies and organisational structures.

Engaging with non-state actors: challenges and opportunities

For the humanitarian actor, engagement with non-state actors poses a complex challenge. Increasingly as the resurgence of state authority has narrowed humanitarian operational access and space, the non-state actor has proven conversely to be a potential vehicle for the provision of international humanitarian assistance. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Eelam and more recently Jamaat-ud-Dawa have at various times and in various ways been seen as potential means to provide relief assistance to areas where governments have either refused to provide assistance or did not themselves have access to do so.

Whether it be to provide assistance for civilians to whom groups such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa may have access in parts of Pakistan or whether it was to teach the PKK “how to petition groups such as the UN for relief” for Turkish Kurds, the corridor of the non-state actor seemed a reasonable opening – if adequately monitored – to provide assistance to the crisis affected. Here though a US Supreme Court decision in June 2010 virtually shut the door on that potential route. In a 6-3 decision, the court ruled that it was a violation of the law, ie, the Patriot Act, if an individual providing help or support knew that the receiving group was on the US terror list or was an organisation that had engaged in terrorist activities.

That humanitarian corridor was further narrowed by the United Kingdom’s Department of International Development when it stated that

a particular issue relating to counter-terrorism has arisen in several complex emergences recently…and is likely to come up more often in the future. DFID, on occasion, had to stop funding the humanitarian work of international NGOs and other implementing partners because they could not 100% ensure that a terrorist organisation would not indirectly or directly benefit. [DFID Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, p.41]

European legislation similarly stipulates that anybody directly or indirectly funding terrorist organisations will be prosecuted under criminal law. Exemptions can be made by the European Council on humanitarian grounds, though the long, drawn-out process is not the mechanism that one needs under the pressure of a humanitarian crisis.

Thus as we look to the changing geo-political context, it is all too evident that the humanitarian sector is faced with a considerable conundrum. In a world in which the types, dimensions and dynamics of humanitarian threats will increase substantially, the 21^st century organisation with humanitarian roles and responsibilities will have to engage with crisis threatened and affected populations in different ways.

The relatively easy access that international humanitarian organisations normally had into disaster-affected countries is increasingly a thing of the past. Concerned humanitarian actors will have to seek ways to be less intrusive while at the same time demonstrating that they have competencies which governments of disaster-affected countries do not have readily available. Their use and engagement will be increasingly determined by the innovations and innovative practices that they can provide and less upon the human resources that they offer.

         In order to reduce the chaos that all too often ensues at the outset of a humanitarian crisis when affected countries find themselves inundated with well-intentioned relief organisations, governments may well insist upon pre-response arrangements (PRAs). PRAs will probably be based not only upon an organisation’s technical capacities, but also upon its cultural sensitivities and linguistic capacities.

Consistent with the importance of greater emphasis upon anticipation, the humanitarian agenda will most likely place far greater emphasis upon longer-term vulnerability mapping and monitoring. And, clearly such far more extensive vulnerability mapping and monitoring should result in fostering greater collaboration between those organisations with humanitarian roles and responsibilities and relevant government institutions.

As one looks to approaches for humanitarian engagement in this new political construct, one also might consider more regional focus. Too often humanitarian planning is conducted within national borders and lacks the cross-border, regional perspectives that reflect some of the critical sources of potential crises. While this is an important perspective for operational planning, the regional focus also offers ‘back door’ means for providing assistance, an alternative corridor. The government of Myanmar in 2008 offers a case in point. It was unwilling to have a tide of international agencies intervene in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, but it was willing to accept the assistance of an organisation of the region, namely, ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations.

If international humanitarian organisations will have to adjust many aspects of their operational approaches when it comes to dealing with governments of vulnerable states, their efforts to deal with the contending interests associated with non-state actors will probably prove even more complex. There is no simple answer, no obvious or consistent process. If, however, one looks at foreseeable negotiations with Afghanistan’s Taliban, the United States and other members of ISAF then at least there are potentially useful parallels that might widen what are increasingly narrowing corridors.

The parallels begin with an acceptance that greater sensitivity to the cultures and historic interests of local peoples can result in accommodation on many fronts, including political arrangements. As Ambassador Cowper Coles noted in his recently published, Cables from Kabul, the antagonism with which groups such as the Taliban are held is alienating and perpetuates hostility and violence. Engagement for a common purpose promotes mutually acceptable compromise. One step towards that end is to foster a shared sense of values when it comes to saving lives. It is a step that the humanitarian sector cannot do alone, but can use its influence to promote.

If the effort is not made, if alternative approaches for adjusting to the changing dynamics of geo-politics in the second decade of the 21^st century are not vigorously exploited, the corridors for providing humanitarian assistance will continue to become ever narrower.